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Quantum key distribution allows secure key distribution between remote communication par-
ties. In a quantum network, multiple users are connected by quantum links for key distribution
and classical links for encrypted data transmission. When the quantum network structure becomes
complicated with a large number of users, it is important to investigate network issues, including
security, key management, latency, reliability, scalability, and cost. In this work, we utilize the clas-
sical network theory and graph theory to establish a framework for a quantum network, addressing
two critical issues, security and key management. First, we design a communication scheme with
the highest security level that trusts a minimum number of intermediate nodes. Second, when the
quantum key is a limited resource, we design key management and data scheduling schemes to opti-
mize the utility of data transmission. Our results can be directly applied to the current metropolitan
and free-space quantum network implementations and can potentially be a standard approach for
future quantum network designs.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a principal part of quantum cryptography, quan-
tum key distribution (QKD) allows remote communica-
tion parties to share identical and private keys for encryp-
tion and decryption [1, 2], whose information-theoretical
security is guaranteed by the fundamental principles of
quantum mechanics [3, 4]. The practical implementation
of QKD has a booming development since the beginning
of this century. For the most popularly applied photon
source — highly attenuated weak coherent state light, the
decoy state method [5–7] addresses security issues caused
by the information leakage of multi-photon components.
Since then, many long-distance QKD experiments have
been demonstrated around the world [8–13]. In the mean
time, the measurement-device-independent quantum key
distribution (MDI-QKD) protocol has been proposed to
address the detection loophole problems [14], which has
been demonstrated both in the lab [15–19] and in field
[20, 21]. Recently, theoretical development on MDI-QKD
shows that one can further double the secure communi-
cation distance [22, 23]. All these developments suggest
that point-to-point QKD over hundreds of kilometers is
ready for real-life implementation.
The initial proposal of QKD deals with a two-user com-
munication scenario. In practice, one needs to extend
point-to-point links to a network. To this day, there
have been a number of experimental demonstrations on
the field test of quantum networks. Several testing im-
plementations of quantum networks have been realized
in the China, Europe, Japan, and USA [24–28]. Today,
the topological structures of QKD networks have become
more complex than the early ones [24, 25, 27], such as
the backbone type structure in 46-node Hefei network,
and the star-type structure in MDI-QKD network [29].
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Besides these fiber-based quantum networks, a satellite-
relayed quantum network has been realized recently [30],
in which a secret key was exchanged between interconti-
nental communication partners. The work demonstrates
the possibility to realize a global quantum network. In
the mean time, researchers explore the feasibility of hy-
bridizing discrete variable schemes with continuous vari-
able ones [31, 32] in a quantum network and integrating
QKD into classical networks, such as utilizing wavelength
division multiplexing technique [33, 34].
The ultimate goal of quantum communication is to re-
alize large scale quantum networks. There are a few ma-
jor challenges a quantum network faces, including (i) de-
signing the proper topological structure, (ii) assessing the
security levels, and (iii) managing secure keys. Recently,
an engineering framework of a scalable multi-site quan-
tum network has been established [35], in which a QKD
system is divided into multiple layers: host layer, key
management layer, QKD network layer, and quantum
link layer. The core of designing and operating a quan-
tum network lies in the key management layer and QKD
network layer, where the issues of security, key manage-
ment [36], data routing [37], and stability should be dealt
with to optimize transmission performance at a low cost.
In a quantum network, communication between two
users are often relayed by intermediate nodes. These
nodes can be divided into two types, trusted nodes and
untrusted nodes, depending on whether or not the secu-
rity of communication relies on the security of the nodes,
respectively. A trusted node executes full QKD with ad-
jacent nodes and announces the parities of the two key
bit strings such that end users can share secret keys. For
example, Alice and Bob establish keys, denoted by ka and
kb, with an intermediate trusted node. The trusted node
announces ka⊕kb, and eventually, Alice and Bob share a
key ka. Whereas, an untrusted node can be as simple as
an optical switch, or it can be an untrusted measurement
site used in MDI-QKD schemes. In a simple network
structure, such as the MDI-QKD network [29], users can
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2communicate without trusting any intermediate nodes.
Since the security of communication does not depend on
untrusted nodes, we can only consider the trusted nodes
in the following discussions on security assessment. In
this paper, we assume all users in the network are con-
nected with insecure classical communication channels,
which are treated as a free resource. We focus the case
where quantum keys are consumed for private communi-
cation.
Security is a crucial issue in a quantum network, which
may be compromised if an adversary, Eve, can manipu-
late or crack intermediate trusted nodes. In reality, it is
important to evaluate security if Eve can at least com-
promise one of the nodes. In the extreme case where Eve
can hack all but the two communicating nodes, no se-
cure communication can be established unless there is a
direct QKD link between the two parties. Thus, we first
consider the interesting problem of security assessment
when a certain amount of the nodes are compromised.
In particular, for a general network structure, we find an
optimal communication scheme with the highest security
level, using the graph representation of a quantum net-
work [38, 39]. With the highest security level, the com-
munication is secure unless the nodes that eavesdropper
compromises form a cut in the graph of the quantum net-
work, which is the ultimate solution of an efficient attack
strategy by the adversary.
Another issue addressed in this work is data deliv-
ery and key management in the network. In private
key systems such as QKD, the encoding process may
consumes keys with the same length as the message.
With the current quantum technology, the key gener-
ation speed (10 Mbps) is far below the speed of clas-
sical data transmission (1 Tbps). Thus, the key is
a limited resource in a network for most communica-
tion tasks. In a network with multiple communication
tasks, the lack of key management will lead to insta-
bility and inefficiency. To address this issue and opti-
mize network management, we adopt techniques address-
ing similar problems in the classical network research.
Specifically, we formulate the problem of QKD-based
network communication as a flow scheduling problem in
resource-constrained networks, such as processing net-
works [40, 41] and energy-harvesting networks [42, 43]. In
this formulation, each data transmission consumes sup-
porting resources (in our case, quantum key bits), and
the network operator needs to jointly optimize resource
usage, data routing, and scheduling. Then, to solve the
problem of key-constrained data transmission, we adopt
the Lyapunov network optimization technique [44] and
design a key management and data scheduling algorithm
that has low-implementation complexity. We also rig-
orously show that our algorithm achieves near-optimal
performance in terms of data transmission utility.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion II, we focus on the security assessment of a quantum
network. Inspired by the dual property of cut and flow,
we propose a communication scheme that exploits the
key generation capacity of the whole network, and prove
that the proposed scheme is optimal in terms of security.
In Section III, we construct a flow model for a quantum
network and formulate equations to describe inefficiencies
in the network. We present our strategy to optimize the
network efficiency and describe how this strategy works
at the network control and key management layer. Fi-
nally, we conclude in Section IV.
II. SECURITY ASSESSMENT
The security in a quantum network lies in two aspects:
quantum channel and intermediate nodes. The former
has been well studied in the security analysis of QKD;
while the latter is a new problem emerging in quantum
networks. Trusted nodes can extend communication dis-
tances while keeping a relatively high key rate. At a cost,
the security of communication can be compromised by
the trustworthiness of intermediate relay nodes. In prac-
tice, an important issue to address is how to design a key
exchange procedure, so that it can tolerate the maximal
number of compromised nodes. A related question from
the hacking point of view is to figure out the optimal
strategy (by cracking into the minimal number of nodes)
for Eve to successfully hack the network.
In this section, we first present our network model.
Then, we consider several simple strategies and provide
the corresponding attack strategies. After that, we pro-
pose the strongest attack by taking into account the diffi-
culty of Eve’s attack strategy. We find a communication
strategy with the highest security level, which is secure
unless nodes compromised by Eve cut off the entire com-
munication network.
A. Network model
As its classical counterparts, a quantum network can
be modeled by a graph G = (N ,L), where N and L
are the sets of vertices and edges, respectively. Here a
vertex c ∈ N represents a basic unit in a quantum net-
work, which can be a node or even a QKD sub-network
whose internal structure is unrelated to the security as-
sessment. An edge in the graph represents a QKD link,
which is used to share secure key strings between con-
nected nodes. We focus on the security of nodes and
trust the security of QKD links, i.e., assume the QKD
process has been completed and secret keys have been
generated. For example, in this model, the untrusted
measurement site in MDI-QKD is merged into the link
as an edge in the graph. We have the following assump-
tions for the adversary Eve. a) Eve has access to all
classical channels. b) Eve has no information about the
quantum key of an edge if she does not compromise ei-
ther of the connected nodes. c) Eve learns everything of
the quantum key if she compromises at least one of the
connected nodes. An example of a quantum network is
3shown in Fig. 1, where Alice and Bob are two communi-
cating parties. There are 5 intermediate nodes between
them denoted by c1 ∼ c5, and 9 edges k1 ∼ k9, each
representing a quantum channel or quantum key strings
generated between the connected nodes.
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FIG. 1. Graph representation of a quantum network. Alice
and Bob are the two communicating parties denoted by a and
b, respectively. There are 5 intermediate nodes between them,
denoted by c1 ∼ c5. Each edge represents a quantum chan-
nel or quantum key strings generated between the connected
nodes, denoted by k1 ∼ k9.
Here, we use the path concept in the graph theory to
describe the sequence of nodes used in message trans-
mission. We only consider simple paths here since any
loop of the message transmission is useless in a network.
Take the red line in Figure 1 as an example. Once Alice
and Bob pick a path, all intermediate nodes are fixed:
a→ c1 → c2 → b. There are two means for private com-
munication. One is that Alice and Bob ask all the inter-
mediate nodes (c1 and c2 in this example) to announce
the parities from the exclusive-or (XOR) operations on
the key bit strings with their two neighbours in the path.
In the example, c1 announces k1 ⊕ k3 and c2 announces
k3⊕k6. Then, Alice and Bob can share a secure key, with
which they can communicate privately. Alternatively, Al-
ice can send the message encrypted by the secure key k1
to her neighbour c1, who passes to the next node until
reaching Bob. In theory, both ways of private communi-
cation are equally secure. In practice, the first method
is better because the intermediate nodes do not obtain
the message directly. In the following discussions, how-
ever, we take the second method for the sake of simplicity.
Alice sends a random bit string to Bob, denoted as “mes-
sages” in the following discussions, which is later used for
other cryptographic tasks between Alice and Bob. Note
that in a large network setting, it is impractical to assume
all the intermediate nodes to announce the key parities
in public for key exchange of end users. In reality, a node
will receive an encrypted message from one of its neigh-
bours and a request to convey the massage to another
neighbour privately. This situation is very similar to the
current internet data transmission, and is the reason why
we consider the second communication scenario.
B. Multi-path communication scheme and
strongest attack
Let us begin with a simple case with only one single-
line path, which is represented by the red line a→ c1 →
c2 → b in Figure 1. Alice sends the message to her neigh-
bour relay node encrypted with the quantum key. The
message is decrypted and re-encrypted by intermediate
nodes and finally received by Bob. This is a strategy that
consumes the least amount of keys. In terms of security,
this scheme can be weak because once Eve cracked any
node on the path, she gets the message.
In order to strengthen the single-path strategy, one
can introduce an additional disjoint path, the blue line
a→ c3 → c4 → c5 → b shown in Figure 1, to defend the
single-point eavesdropping attack. The second path is
used to transmit another independent random bit string.
The final message is the XOR result of the two strings
transmitted via the two paths. The details of the com-
munication scheme is shown in Box 1.
Box 1: Two-path communication scheme. The
two paths are the red line a→ c1 → c2 → b and
the blue line a → c3 → c4 → c5 → b shown in
Figure 1.
1. Alice holds the message x and generates a
random bit string y locally with the same
length |x| = |y|.
2. Alice sends the message x⊕y to her neigh-
bor node c1 and y to c3, encrypted by
quantum keys.
3. The node c1 sends x ⊕ y through the red
path to c2, and eventually to Bob. Simi-
larly, c3 sends y through the blue path to
c4, to c5, and eventually to Bob.
4. Finally, Bob receives y and x ⊕ y from
the two different paths. He obtains the
message x by applying an XOR operation,
x = x⊕ y ⊕ y.
Suppose Eve can only successfully hack one of the in-
termediate nodes, she can only learn y or x ⊕ y, and
hence the transmission of x is still secure. In fact, if
Eve can only hack the nodes in one of the two paths
(red or blue), the transmission is secure. Only when Eve
can hack nodes from both paths, say c2 and c3, she can
eavesdrop the message. Obviously, the two-path scheme
is securer than the single-path one in practice.
Generally, we can increase the number of paths to in-
crease the communication security. The two-path scheme
shown in Box 1 can be generalized to a multi-path
scheme. Sometimes, adding a path may not increase the
security. For example, in the aforementioned two-path
strategy, if we add the third path, Alice → c1 → c4 →
4c5 → Bob, the security will not be enhanced since any
hacking strategy that can successfully break the security
of the two-path scheme will also break this three-path
case. In order to design a robust communication scheme
against compromised nodes, the crucial question here is
to add proper paths. From the hacking point of view,
given a communication scheme and a maximal number
of nodes she can hack, Eve should choose the nodes to
be compromised smartly so that the attack works.
Now, we model communication schemes and define the
security levels regarding a quantum network formally.
DenoteM to be the set of paths used in a communication
scheme. All the paths goes from Alice to Bob. In data
transmission, Alice generates |M| random bit strings,
y1, y2, . . . , y|M|, and sends each through the paths in the
setM independently similar to the one described in Box
1. Here, we can see that a path set M corresponds to a
communication scheme.
For a graph G = (N ,L), denote A ∈ N \ {Alice,Bob}
the set of compromised nodes, which uniquely deter-
mines Eve’s hacking strategy. In the following discussion,
we exclude the obvious case where there exists a direct
QKD link between Alice and Bob. A Boolean function
sec(A,M) of a communication scheme and hacking strat-
egy is defined as follows.
Definition 1. For a communication scheme M and
Eve’s strategy A, if M is secure against compromised
nodes in A, then sec(A,M) = 1, and otherwise,
sec(A,M) = 0.
We can see that sec(A,M) = 0 if and only if for each
path in M, it goes through at least one nodes in the
set of A. Alternatively speaking, sec(A,M) = 1 if and
only if there at least one path in M which does not go
through any nodes in the set of A. We now define a
strongest attack to be the most powerful attack that can
successfully hack all possible communication schemes.
Definition 2. A strongest attack Ast can successfully
hack all possible communication schemes,
∀M, sec(Ast,M) = 0. (1)
By definition, we see that a strongest attack should
contain at least one node of each possible path between
Alice and Bob. When Eve compromises a node, by defi-
nition, we assume that she knows all the keys distributed
from (and to) this node. From a security point of view,
one can think of Eve making those connecting edges in-
secure. Given an attack A, define LA ⊆ L the set of
insecure edges caused by this attack. If Alice and Bob
cannot be connected by a path without using any edges
in LA, no secure path can be found under this attack
and such attack is strongest. Thus, we have the follow-
ing theorem.
Theorem 1. Attack A is strongest if and only if Alice
and Bob belongs to different disjoint subsets partitioned
by a cut-set contained in LA.
Proof. Proof of “if”: a cut in the graph theory is a parti-
tion of the nodes into two disjoint subsets. It determines
a cut-set, the set of edges whose two end nodes belongs
to different subsets of the partition. Alice and Bob be-
longs to different subsets. Hence any path connecting
Alice and Bob must have at least one edge that connect
two nodes of different subset. From the definition, this
edge belongs to the cut-set. That is, any path connect-
ing them must contain at least one edge in the cut-set.
Then, no secure communication is possible. The attack
is strongest.
Proof of “only if”: we need to prove that if LA contains
no cut-set, there must be a secure path between Alice and
Bob. Consider the set of nodes that have secure paths
to Alice, if Bob belongs to this set, the proof is done by
finding the secure path. If Bob does not belong to it, this
set and its compliment set are two disjoint subsets. This
partition is a cut. The cut-set must be contained in LA
and hence A is strongest.
From the theorem, we can have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. If an attack is not strongest, there exists
a secure path connecting Alice and Bob.
C. Communication scheme of the highest security
level
Now, we want to study the most secure communica-
tion scheme. That is, such a scheme can tolerate any
attacks that other schemes can tolerate. Denote the set
of strongest attacks to be A st.
Definition 3. A communication scheme, Mh, has the
highest security level if
Mh : sec(A,Mh) =
{
0 A ∈ {Ast}
1 otherwise
(2)
Here we propose a scheme M0 with the highest secu-
rity level.
Definition 4. In the communication scheme M0, each
node in the network except Alice and Bob sends the XOR
result of all the keys from the neighbor connections to Bob
via unencrypted channels (available to Eve).
We take the network in Figure 1 as an example. c1 will
announce k1⊕k4⊕k6, c2 will announce k6⊕k7⊕k9, etc.
Of course, Alice’s and Bob’s positions are symmetric. All
the parity information can be sent to Alice. The scheme
still works.
Theorem 2. Scheme M0, defined in Definition 4, is of
the highest security level.
Proof. First, we need to show that this scheme can yield
an identical key between Alice and Bob. On Alice’s side,
she performs the XOR operation to all the keys connected
5to her and obtains kA. Upon receiving all the parity infor-
mation from the network, Bob performs XOR operation
on all the parity bit string along with his keys connected
to his neighbors. Then, all the keys in this network ap-
pear in this XOR operation twice except those of the
nodes connected directly with Alice. Thus, Bob’s XOR
result gives kA and all others are canceled out. In the
end, they can achieve an identical key.
Then, we show that the generated key is secure for
any attacks that are not strongest. If an attack is not
strongest, from Corollary 1, we can find a secure path
between Alice and Bob. For the scheme M0, one can
think of kA a secure random key bit string being trans-
mitted from Alice to Bob with one-time pad encryption
[45] and being XOR with some extra random bit strings
that might known to Eve. Specifically, suppose the se-
cure path is Alice → c1 → c2 → · · · → cs → Bob. Then
Alice can send her random bit string via this path to Bob.
In this case, she adds more unrelated random bit strings,
which will not affect the security of the transmission.
Finally, it is obvious that M0 is insecure under a
strongest attack, since it forms a cut between Alice and
Bob.
III. UTILITY OPTIMIZATION AND KEY
MANAGEMENT
When maximizing the security of the network in the
previous section, we essentially assume that the key from
QKD is sufficient for encryption. While in a practical
quantum network, the amount of key is usually limited
since QKD is normally far slower than classical communi-
cation. In this section, we consider the scenario where the
quantum key is a limited source and there are multiple
communication tasks. The problem becomes how to op-
timize certain network metrics through key management,
data scheduling, and routing. For instance, we need to
evaluate the encrypted data transmission capacity of a
quantum network, i.e., how much data can be transmit-
ted within a unit time. Here, we borrow techniques in a
classical energy harvesting network [42]. The main dif-
ference is that the key (corresponding to the energy in
an energy harvesting network) is defined over channels
rather than nodes, which leads to different target func-
tions and constraints in our optimization problem.
Again, we follow the graph theory expression G =
(N ,L) to represent a quantum network. Specifically,
a, b ∈ N represent nodes and l[a,b] represents the link
between a and b. The time is discretized in the following
discussions and t is the index of the time slot. We sum-
marize the notations in Table I and make the following
remarks. The working condition of QKD S[a,c](t) is a
Boolean function and the key management strategy lies
in the balance between S[a,c](t)K[a,c] and P[a,c](t), rep-
resenting the key generation and consumption, respec-
tively. During data transmission, we only care about
their destinations and classify the data accordingly. For
example, we call the data flow with the final destina-
tion to node b as type-b data. Data scheduling is de-
termined by Rba(t), type-b data admitted to a at time
t. Since secure data transmission needs encryption, it
is given by a function of the key consumption, i.e.,
µ[a,c](t) = µ[a,c](P[a,c](t)). In particular, for the case of
one-time pad encryption, µ[a,c](t) = P[a,c](t). The total
data transmission on an edge l[a,c] is the sum of all types
of data transmission, i.e., µ[a,c](t) =
∑
b µ
b
[a,c](t). The key
generation rate K[a,c] is determined by the QKD setting
between two adjacent nodes, a and c. The key is stored
in the edge with a storage upper bound θ[a,c]. When the
amount of key stored in the edge l[a,c] ∈ L is larger than
θ[a,c] at time slot t, QKD in this edge becomes inactive,
i.e., S[a,c](t) = 0.
TABLE I. Notations. The subscript [a, c] refers to a quantity
defined between the adjacent nodes a and c. Denote the data
transmitted to b as type-b data.
Symbol Interpretation
N Number of nodes in the network, |N |
L Number of edges in the network, |L|
N in(out)a Set of nodes connected to (from) node a
Qba(t) Total type-b data queue at node a
E[a,c](t) Amount of key stored
K[a,c] Amount of key generated per time slot
S[a,c](t) Working condition of QKD
θ[a,c] Saturation of key storage
µ[a,c](t) Total data transmission
µb[a,c](t) Type-b data transmission
P[a,c](t) Key consumption
Rba(t) New type-b data transmission request at node a
A. Utility optimization problem
The data transmission capacity problem is a special
case of the utility optimization problems. The utility is
defined on each data flow, i.e., U ba(R
b
a(t)), which quanti-
fies how much one can benefit from achieving a data rate
Rba(t). The concrete expression of the utility function can
be defined according to practical applications. A com-
mon utility function is concave with the data transmis-
sion flow, for example, U ba(R
b
a(t)) = k log2(R
b
a(t)), where
the coefficient k can be as simple as a constant. In par-
ticular, when U ba(R
b
a(t)) = R
b
a(t), the utility optimization
problem reduces to the data transmission capacity prob-
lem.
The objective of the problem is to optimize the network
utility obtained from serving data traffic. Specifically, we
consider the following network utility,
Utot(~r) =
∑
a,b∈N
U ba(r
b
a), (3)
6where the average type-b data transmission rate at node
a is given by
rba ≡ lim inf
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
τ=0
Rba(τ), (4)
and ~r is the matrix with elements of rba. In order to eval-
uate the data transmission capacity for a quantum net-
work, we need to optimize Eq. (3) with certain dynamics
and constraints.
B. Dynamics and constraints in a quantum
network
Now, we model the dynamics, shown in Fig. 2, and the
constraints in the network model. First, we have the key
storage dynamics,
E[a,c](t+ 1) = E[a,c](t)− P[a,c](t) + S[a,c](t)K[a,c], (5)
where the increase of the key volume S[a,c](t)K[a,c] comes
from QKD and the decrease −P[a,c](t) is caused by key
consumption for encryption. Note that in Eq. (5), the
key storage should be non-negative, ∀ t, l[a,c] ∈ L,
E[a,c](t) ≥ P[a,c](t). (6)
This key availability constraint, Eq. (6), is a compli-
cated constraint as it couples the key consumption ac-
tions across time, i.e., a current P[a,c](t) decision can af-
fect future actions.
Similarly, we have the data transmission dynamics,
Qba(t+1) ≤ Qba(t)+Rba(t)+
∑
c∈N ina
µb[c,a](t)−
∑
c∈Noutn
µb[a,c](t).
(7)
The amount of type-b data to be transmitted at node
a come from two sources: data flow from other nodes
to node a,
∑
c∈N ina µ
b
[c,a](t); and new data admitted to
a for b, Rba(t). Meanwhile, the queue will decrease
if data is transmitted from a to other adjacent nodes∑
c∈Noutn µ
b
[a,c](t). The inequality is due to the possibil-
ity that neighbor nodes may not have enough data to
fulfill the allocated rate. In the following discussions,
we just take it as an equality, as when the rate is over-
allocated, one can just send some dummy data. Finally,
we take account of the stability of the network. That is,
the data queue backlog of the whole network needs to be
convergent with time,
Q¯ ≡ lim sup
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
τ=0
∑
a,b
Qba(τ) <∞. (8)
The stability condition makes sure that all packets ad-
mitted into the network are eventually delivered.
C. Algorithm design
To solve the utility optimization problem defined in
Section III A, we design an algorithm based on the Lya-
punov optimization technique [46], which has found wide
applications in different network scenarios [47–49]. De-
fine the Lyapunov function,
L(t) ≡ 1
2
∑
a,b∈N
[Qba(t)]
2 +
1
2
∑
l[a,c]∈L
[E[a,c](t)− θ[a,c]]2, (9)
where the storage saturation values θ[a,c] should be cho-
sen carefully in the algorithm as discussed later in this
section. Define the following drift-plus-penalty [46] for
our algorithm design, so as to optimize utility while en-
suring network stability,
∆V (t) ≡ ∆(t)− V
∑
a,b∈N
U(Rba(t)), (10)
where V is a tunable positive constant and
∆(t) = L(t+ 1)− L(t). (11)
The construction of the target function, Eq. (10), is sim-
ilar to the Lagrange multiplier method.
Then, we choose the control action to minimize the
drift-plus-penalty given in Eq. (10). Using the queueing
dynamics in Eqs. (5) and (7), after some algebras, we
decouple the key management and data transmission, so
that we can optimize them separately. In the end, the
target function Eq. (10) can be rewritten as
∆V (t) ≤ B +
∑
l[a,c]∈L
(E[a,c](t)− θ[a,c])S[a,c](t)K[a,c]
−
∑
a,b∈N
[V U ba(R
b
a(t))−Qba(t)Rba(t)]
−
∑
a,b∈N
∑
c∈Nouta
µb[a,c](t)[Q
b
a(t)−Qbc(t)]
−
∑
l[a,c]∈L
(E[a,c](t)− θ[a,c])P[a,c](t).
(12)
Here the constant B is given by
B ≡ N2(3
2
d2maxµ
2
max +R
2
max) +
L
2
(Pmax +Kmax)
2,
(13)
where the subscript max means the maximal possible
values in the strategies and dmax = maxa(|N ina |, |N outa |).
The detailed derivations of Eq. (12) is presented in Ap-
pendix. A.
Before we give the utility optimization algorithm, we
need to introduce the following network technical terms.
The saturation of the key storage, θ[a,c], is defined as
θ[a,c] ≡ δβV + Pmax, (14)
where δ is a positive constant satisfying µ[a,c](P[a,c](t)) ≤
δP[a,c](t) and β is the largest first derivative of the utility
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(a) (b)
FIG. 2. Dynamics in a quantum network. (a) Dynamics of the data queue, as formulated in Eq. (5). (b) Dynamics of the key
storage, as formulated in Eq. (7).
functions, β = maxa,b βa,b = maxn,c(U
b
a)
′(0). Here, we
only consider (U ba)
′(0) since the utility function is con-
cave. The operational meaning of θ[a,c] is to let key stor-
age be saturated to a positive constant θ[a,c] rather than
zero since we often need a positive key storage to handle
urgent data transmission tasks.
Then, we define the weight of the type-b data over the
link l[a,c] as
W b[a,c](t) = max(Q
b
a(t)−Qbc(t)− γ, 0). (15)
The link weight is given by W[a,c](t) = maxbW
b
[a,c](t).
Here, γ is defined as
γ ≡ Rmax + dmaxµmax, (16)
which means the maximum possible increase of the data
queue in a node in a single time slot, including the max-
imum endogenous increase dmaxµmax and exogenous in-
crease Rmax. We consider a data transmission task by
some link l[a,c] to be important only when the data queue
difference between two nodes, Qba(t) − Qbc(t), is large
enough (larger than γ).
The main idea of the algorithm is to optimize the data
transmission, Rba(t) (∀a, b ∈ N ), and key management,
P[a,c](t) (∀l[a,c] ∈ L), by minimizing the target function,
Eq. (12), subject to Eqs. (6) and (7). In Eq. (12) we
can see that the optimization of Rba(t) and P[a,c](t) can
be done separately. Note that the network stability con-
straint Eq. (8) is automatically satisfied under the Lya-
punov drift approaches Eq. (11). The total utility Eq. (3)
is not optimized directly, but the optimization result can
be arbitrarily close to maximum utility of Eq. (3), which
will be discussed in details in Sec. III D.
Now, we present the main optimization algorithm
given in Table II, inspired by the energy-limited schedul-
ing algorithm [42].
D. Analysis of the algorithm and its performance
Here, we explain how the algorithm works and analyze
its performance. We make some remarks on the details
of the algorithm. First, the key availability constraint
given in Eq. (6) is actually redundant, i.e., we can directly
optimize Eq. (18) without any constraint and obtain the
same key management action. To prove this, we have the
following lemma and leave the proof in Appendix B
Lemma 1. The data queue and key storage have the
following deterministic bounds, ∀a, b, t, l[a,c] ∈ L,
0 ≤ Qba(t) ≤ βV +Rmax,
0 ≤ E[a,c](t) ≤ θ[a,c] +Kmax.
(19)
Suppose the optimized key consumption vector ob-
tained by Eq. (18) is ~P ∗(t). Then we consider a new key
consumption vector ~P0(t) by setting P
∗
[a,c](t) in
~P ∗(t) to
be 0, i.e., the only difference between ~P ∗(t) and ~P0(t) is
the key consumption in the link l[a,c]. If the constraint
Eq. (6) is violated, i.e., E[a,c] < P[a,c], then
G( ~P ∗(t))−G( ~P0(t))
= µ[a,c](P
∗
[a,c](t))W[a,c](t) +
(
E[a,c](t)− θ[a,c]
)
P ∗[a,c](t)
≤ δP ∗[a,c](t)(βV − dmaxµmax)− δβV P ∗[a,c](t)
< 0,
(20)
which leads to a contradiction that ~P ∗(t) is not the op-
timized strategy. The first inequality is obtained by
Lemma 1 and µ[a,c](P
∗
[a,c](t)) ≤ δP ∗[a,c](t) is due to the
definition of δ of Eq. (14). Especially, for one-time-pad
encryption, we have µ[a,c](P
∗
[a,c](t)) = P
∗
[a,c](t) and we can
take δ ≥ 1.
Second, in steps key management and routing and
scheduling, we make an optimization on the destination
b, i.e., we only consider the destination b∗ with the max-
8TABLE II. Utility optimization algorithm.
1. Input of the algorithm. Initialize θ[a,c]. At every time slot t, observe Q
b
a(t) and E[a,c](t).
2. Key generation. If E[a,c](t) − θ[a,c] < 0, perform key generation, i.e., let S[a,c](t) = 1; otherwise, let S[a,c](t) = 0.
Note that this decision minimizes the second term on the right-hand side of Eq. (12).
3. Data transmission. Make a local optimization on the third term of the right-hand side of Eq. (12),
max
Rba(t)
V Uba(R
b
a(t))−Qba(t)Rba(t), (17)
with the constraint of 0 < Rba(t) < Rmax.
4. Key management. Optimize the key consumption over all edges, ~P (t), by solving the following maximization
max
~P (t)
G(~P (t)) =
∑
n∈N
∑
c∈Nouta
µ[a,c](t)W[a,c](t)
+
∑
l[a,c]∈L
(E[a,c](t)− θ[a,c])P[a,c](t)
=
∑
l[a,c]∈L
{
µ[a,c](t)W[a,c](t) + (E[a,c](t)− θ[a,c])P[a,c](t)
}
,
(18)
subject to the key availability constraint Eq. (6).
5. Routing and scheduling. Find b∗ ∈ argmaxbW b[a,c](t). If W b
∗
[a,c](t) > 0, set µ
b∗
[a,c](t) = µ[a,c](t), i.e., allocate the full
rate over the link l[a,c] to any commodity achieving the maximum positive weight.
6. Queue update. Update Qba(t) and E[a,c](t) according to their dynamics Eqs. (5) and (7), respectively.
imum link weight, because∑
b
µb[a,c](t)W
b
[a,c](t) ≤
∑
b
µb[a,c](t)W[a,c](t)
= µ[a,c](t)W[a,c](t)
(21)
Therefore, it is optimal to allocate the full rate over the
link l[a,c] to any commodity achieving the maximum pos-
itive weight. If there are multiple destinations b∗ achiev-
ing the maximum link weight, we can randomly choose
one of them to allocate the full rate.
Third, one can see that the optimized target function
in the algorithm is different from the original utility func-
tion given in Eq. (3). We want to show that the opti-
mization result of the algorithm can be arbitrary close
to the optimal utility Utot, i.e., the performance of the
algorithm is given by the following theorem and leave its
proof in Appendix C.
Theorem 3. The utility optimization result of the algo-
rithm can be arbitrarily close to the optimal utility Utot,
lim inf
τ→∞ Utot(~r(τ)) = lim infτ→∞
∑
n,c
U ba(r
b
a(τ))
≥ Utot(~r∗)− B˜
V
,
(22)
where rba(τ) =
1
τ
∑τ−1
t=0 R
b
a(t) is the average data flow,
B˜ = B+N2γdmaxµmax is a constant, and ~r∗ is an opti-
mal solution for Eq. (3).
Finally, compared to the original algorithm given in
[42], we can optimize the key management in Eq. (18)
locally for each edge rather than each node. This is a
particularly useful feature for practical implementation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Since the QKD techniques have become mature, net-
work issues should be taken into consideration. In this
work, we propose solutions to two typical and crucial is-
sues in quantum networks, namely security and key man-
agement. We tackle the security issue with graph theory
and design a communication scheme of the highest secu-
rity level, where each node broadcasts the XOR result of
all its keys. To optimize the utility of the data transmis-
sion, we propose a key management and data scheduling
scheme, achieving near optimal data utility while main-
taining the stability of a quantum network.
For future works, one can substitute the data com-
munication requests and key rate of an actual quantum
network (such as the Hefei 46-node network) and make
a field test. One can also consider more complex topo-
logical structures and other practical issues such as the
latency and scalability. Moreover, it is also interesting to
9apply other techniques in the graph theory and network
techniques in quantum network optimization.
Finally, a trusted node does not need to perform full
QKD with users, i.e., the privacy amplification process
can be neglected and raw keys can be directly exchanged
[50]. We call such a node as an honest but curious node.
In this case the security level lies between trusted and
untrusted. The security assessment needs more compli-
cated analysis.
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Appendix A: Derivations of Eq. (12)
By the definition of ∆(t) in Eq. (11), we divide ∆(t)
into two parts. The first part comes from the data queue
term,
1
2
∑
a,b∈N
[Qba(t+ 1)]
2 − 1
2
[Qba(t)]
2
=
∑
a,b∈N
Qba(t)
− ∑
c∈Nouta
µb[a,c](t) +
∑
c∈N ina
µb[c,a](t) +R
b
a(t)

+
1
2
− ∑
c∈Nouta
µb[a,c](t) +
∑
c∈N ina
µb[c,a](t) +R
b
a(t)
2 .
(A1)
For the first term in the rhs. of Eq. (A1), we want to
show that
∑
a,b
Qba(t)
− ∑
c∈Nouta
µb[a,c](t) +
∑
c∈N ina
µb[c,a](t)

=−
∑
a,b∈N
∑
c∈Nouta
µb[a,c](t)[Q
b
a(t)−Qbc(t)].
(A2)
Consider an arbitrary term,
Qba(t)
(
−µb[a,c](t) + µb[a′,a](t)
)
, there will al-
ways be another term in the summation
Qbc(t)
(
−µb[c,c′](t) + µb[a,c](t)
)
. We can regroup these
terms and obtain −µb[a,c](t)[Qba(t)−Qbc(t)]. Similarly, we
can do this for all other terms in the summation and get
the rhs. of Eq. (A2).
For the second term in the rhs. of Eq. (A1), we have
− ∑
c∈Nouta
µb[a,c](t) +
∑
c∈N ina
µb[c,a](t) +R
b
a(t)
2
≤
 ∑
c∈Nouta
µb[a,c](t)
2 +
 ∑
c∈N ina
µb[c,a](t) +R
b
a(t)
2
≤ d2maxµ2max + (dmaxµmax +Rmax)2
≤ d2maxµ2max +
1
2
(d2maxµ
2
max +R
2
max)
= 3d2maxµ
2
max + 2R
2
max.
(A3)
Similar calculations can be done for the second part of
∆(t) which comes from the key storage term. Finally we
can get Eq. (12) by some algebras.
Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 1
We prove this lemma with mathematical induction.
First we can easily see that the bound holds for t = 0,
since Qba(0) = 0 and E[a,c](0) = 0.
Then we prove that if 0 ≤ Qba(t) ≤ βV + Rmax, then
0 ≤ Qba(t+ 1) ≤ βV +Rmax. According to the dynamics
of data queue Eq. (7), we can see that the increase of the
data queue comes from two aspects: endogenous data∑
c∈N ina µ
b
[c,a](t) and exogenous data R
b
a(t). We consider
the following two exclusive cases: first, if there are en-
dogenous data, then they must come from at least one
other node, say c. From Eq. (15), if there is a data flow
from c to a at time t, their data queues at time t must
satisfy,
Qba(t) ≤ Qbc(t)− γ ≤ βV +Rmax − γ. (B1)
From time slot t to t + 1, the maximum possible data
queue increase of one node is γ. Then we have Qba(t+1) ≤
βV +Rmax; second, there are no endogenous data, which
means there are only exogenous data or there are no data
queue increase at all. From Eq. (17), the existence of a
valid optimization result Rba(t) requires Q
b
a(t) ≤ βa,bV ≤
βV . From time slot t to t + 1, the maximum possible
exogenous data queue increase is Rmax. Then we also
have Qba(t+ 1) ≤ βV +Rmax. If there are no data queue
increase from t to t+ 1, it is straightforward that Qba(t+
1) ≤ Qba(t) ≤ βV +Rmax.
Finally we prove if 0 ≤ E[a,c](t) ≤ θ[a,c] + Kmax, then
0 ≤ E[a,c](t + 1) ≤ θ[a,c] + Kmax. We also consider the
following two exclusive cases: according to the second
step of the algorithm, if E[a,c](t) < θ[a,c], there will be key
generation with a maximum key of Kmax, then E[a,c](t+
1) < θ[a,c]+Kmax; if E[a,c](t) ≥ θ[a,c], there will be no key
generation and E[a,c](t+ 1) ≤ E[a,c](t) ≤ θ[a,c] +Kmax.
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Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 3
In the algorithm we minimize the following function at
time t
D(t) =
∑
l[a,c]∈L
(E[a,c](t)− θ[a,c])S[a,c](t)K[a,c]
−
∑
a,b∈N
[V U ba(R
b
a(t))−Qba(t)Rba(t)]
−
∑
a,b∈N
∑
c∈Nouta
µb[a,c](t)[Q
b
a(t)−Qbc(t)− γ]
−
∑
l[a,c]∈L
(E[a,c](t)− θ[a,c])P[a,c](t),
(C1)
and get an optimized set of strategies S =
{Rba(t), P[a,c](t)}. Now we consider another function
D˜(t) =
∑
l[a,c]∈L
(E[a,c](t)− θ[a,c])S[a,c](t)K[a,c]
−
∑
a,b∈N
[V U ba(R
b
a(t))−Qba(t)Rba(t)]
−
∑
a,b∈N
∑
c∈Nouta
µb[a,c](t)[Q
b
a(t)−Qcb(t)]
−
∑
l[a,c]∈L
(E[a,c](t)− θ[a,c])P[a,c](t)
= D(t)−
∑
a,b∈N
∑
c∈Nouta
µb[a,c](t)γ.
(C2)
We can see that the only difference between Eq. (C1)
and Eq. (C2) is that in Eq. (C2) γ is not introduced.
Suppose the optimized strategy to minimize Eq. (C2) is
S˜ = {R˜ba(t), P˜[a,c](t)}. We have the following relation,
DS(t) ≤ DS˜(t)
D˜S˜(t) ≤ D˜S(t).
(C3)
From the first inquaility of Eq. (C3) we quickly get
D˜S(t) ≤ D˜S˜(t) +N2γdmaxµmax. (C4)
Then we substitute Eq. (C4) to Eq. (12),
∆(t)− V
∑
a,b∈N
U ba(R
b
a(t)) ≤ B + D˜S(t) ≤ B˜ + D˜S˜(t),
(C5)
where B˜ = B + N2γdmaxµmax. Since the strategy S˜ =
{R˜ba(t), P˜[a,c](t)} can take continuous values, we apply
the relation −D˜S˜(t) ≥ V Utot(~r∗) given in Theorem 1 of
[42] and Claim 1 of [51]. This means the maximization
of the total utility in a single time slot will be larger than
that in time average,
∆(t)− V
∑
a,b∈N
U ba(R
b
a(t)) ≤ B˜ − V Utot(~r∗). (C6)
Then we sum over Eq. (C6) from t = 0 to t = τ − 1,
L(τ)−L(0)− V
τ−1∑
t=0
∑
a,b∈N
U ba(R
b
a(t)) ≤ τB˜− τV Utot(~r∗).
(C7)
Divide V τ in both sides and use L(τ) ≥ 0 and L(0) = 0,
∑
a,b∈N
U ba(
1
τ
τ−1∑
t=0
Rba(t)) ≥
1
τ
τ−1∑
t=0
∑
a,b∈N
U ba(R
b
a(t))
≥ Utot(~r∗)− B˜
V
,
(C8)
where the first inequality is because the utility function
is concave. Then we take a lim inf as τ →∞ and have
lim inf
τ→∞
∑
a,b
U ba(r
b
a(τ)) ≥ Utot(~r∗)−
B˜
V
. (C9)
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